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PREAMBLE TO THE BILL OF RIGHTS
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This Article considers the civic constitutionalist nature of the
Preamble to the Bill of Rights. Civic constitutionalism is a mode of reading
constitutional texts that considers power in political, as opposed to legal,
terms. Thus, the civic constitution gives citizens, not judges, the primary duty
for ensuring a constitutionally compliant society. This Article also presents
the underlying reasons, effects, and costs of the obscurity of the
civic constitution and, more specifically, the Preamble to the Bill of Rights.
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INTRODUCTION
In this Article, I consider the significance of one of the preambular
provisions of the Constitution for our understanding of civic
constitutionalism. Civic constitutionalism, I argued in Peopling the
Constitution, is a particular way of comprehending what kind of thing the
Constitution is, what sort of authority it commands, and what kind of
community it calls into being. 1 It conceives of constitutional authority in
political rather than legal terms and assigns a very large measure of
responsibility for achieving a constitutional way of life to citizens. Civic
constitutionalism thus stands in contrast to most scholarly accounts of
constitutional maintenance, which instead invest judges, primarily, and other
constitutional offices, secondarily, with responsibility for holding us to our
constitutional commitments. The Constitution’s preambular provisions are
especially important to understanding the Constitution’s civic character.
Preambles are the “key,” in the words of Joseph Story, 2 to reading the
Constitution and also to locating the Constitution’s identity in politics rather
than in law, or in what I have called the “Civic Constitution.”
There are four preambles in the Constitution, including, obviously,
the Great Preamble (We the People). But there are three other preambular
provisions in the document. One is in Article I, Section 8, where Congress is
given the power “to promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 3 Most readings assume this
1

See John E. Finn, The Civic Constitution: Some Preliminaries, in CONSTITUTIONAL
POLITICS: ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTION MAKING, MAINTENANCE, AND CHANGE 41–69
(Sotirios A. Barber & Robert P. George eds., 2001) [hereinafter Preliminaries] (coining the
term “Civic Constitution”); JOHN E. FINN, PEOPLING THE CONSTITUTION 6–8, 129–31, 229
n.43 (Jeffrey K. Tulis & Sanford Levinson eds., 2014) [hereinafter PEOPLING] (explaining
that civic constitutionalism bears a resemblance to popular constitutionalism, but is different
in important ways); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); see generally PEOPLING, supra;
ELIZABETH BEAUMONT, THE CIVIC CONSTITUTION: CIVIC VISIONS AND STRUGGLES IN THE
PATH TOWARD CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (2014); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (2000).
2
BEAU BRESLIN, FROM WORDS TO WORLDS: EXPLORING CONSTITUTIONAL
FUNCTIONALITY 50 (2009) (quoting Joseph Story: “It is an admitted maxim in the ordinary
course of the administration of justice, that the preamble . . . is a key to open the mind of the
makers, as to the mischiefs, which are to be remedied, and the objects, which are to be
accomplished by the provisions of the [text]”) (citation omitted).
3
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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clause simply establishes the power of Congress to grant patents and
copyrights. Garry Wills, however, argues that unlike the rest of Section 8,
which presents the powers of Congress “in the infinitive: to regulate,
commerce, to coin money, to establish a post office, to declare war,”4 the
founders decided in this instance to include a goal, or “mini-preamble,” 5
along with the explicit power. As a result, this power is not presented as an
infinitive power, but rather as a means of achieving the goal of promoting
science and the useful arts.
Wills’s reading of this preamble, especially insofar as it ascribes to it
a purpose to attain a more perfect constitutional order, is welfarist in
character6—it conceives of an ongoing constitutional project committed to
particular ends. This reading implies that its meaning is not purely
exhortatory, but is instead substantive, and that it should influence how we
make sense of and apply it (as a means to the realization of constitutionally
desirable ends). More generally, it hints at how we should read all of the
Constitution’s preambles by suggesting that their significance is not confined
to their infrequent use as interpretive devices in constitutional litigation but
is instead a function of their importance to the larger project of constitutional
maintenance.
Another preamble opens the Second Amendment: “A well-regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” 7 The significance of this
preamble has been a matter of intense scholarly and judicial exegesis for at
least the last two decades.8 Much of this literature, especially in recent years,
has concentrated on the question of whether the Second Amendment
establishes an individual, judicially enforceable right to bear arms and
equally on the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence concerning that
question. But some of this literature has also considered whether the prefatory
4

Deconstructing the Constitution in Support of the Arts, PA. GAZETTE, May 12, 1998,
http://www.upenn.edu/gazette/0598/0598gaz5.html.
5
Id.
6
See SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, WELFARE AND THE CONSTITUTION (2009).
7
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
8
See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637
(1989); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). As I indicate below, however, my argument that the Preamble
to the Bill of Rights tells us to embrace a civic reading of the Bill of Rights may have
important implications for how we should read the preambular language in the Second
Amendment. See infra p. 38 and notes 129–30 and accompanying text.
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clause hints at a civic interpretation of the Amendment’s operative clause.
For example, some scholars, such as David C. Williams and Suzette
Hemberger, have explored whether and to what extent this preamble is
evidence of the civic meaning of the Second Amendment.9
My focus in this Article, in contrast, is on a different, largely forgotten
preamble in the Constitution—the long neglected Preamble to the Bill of
Rights, which in full provides:
Congress of the United States
begun and held at the City of New-York, on
Wednesday the fourth of March, one thousand seven hundred and
eighty nine.
THE Conventions of a number of the States, having at the time of
their adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in order to prevent
misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and
restrictive clauses should be added: And as extending the ground of
public confidence in the Government, will best ensure the beneficent
ends of its institution.
RESOLVED by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America, in Congress assembled, two thirds of both
Houses concurring, that the following Articles be proposed to the
Legislatures of the several States, as amendments to the Constitution
of the United States, all, or any of which Articles, when ratified by
three fourths of the said Legislatures, to be valid to all intents and
purposes, as part of the said Constitution; viz.
ARTICLES in addition to, and Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States of America, proposed by Congress, and ratified by the

9

See David C. Williams, Civic Constitutionalism, the Second Amendment, and the Right
of Revolution, 79 IND. L.J. 379 (2004) [hereinafter Civic Constitutionalism]; see also Suzette
Hemberger, What Did They Think They Were Doing When They Wrote the U.S. Constitution,
and Why Should We Care?, in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTION
MAKING, MAINTENANCE, AND CHANGE, supra note 1; Wendy Brown, Guns, Cowboys,
Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic Republicanism: On Sanford Levinson’s The Embarrassing
Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 661 (1989); see generally David C. Williams, Civic
Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J.
551 (1991) [hereinafter Civic Republicanism] (discussing the Second Amendment and civic
meaning).
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Legislatures of the several States, pursuant to the fifth Article of the
original Constitution.10
At least as measured by academic treatments (which are very few) or
by popular knowledge (which is nonexistent), the Preamble to the Bill of
Rights is obscure if not forgotten.11 Indeed, most copies of the Constitution

10
Robert A. Destro, Federalism, Human Rights, and the Realpolitik of Footnote Four,
12 WIDENER L.J. 373, 381 n.22 (2003). This is not the original text. In the earliest versions,
James Madison proposed a revision to the opening preamble so that it would read: “That the
people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform or change their
government, whenever it be found adverse or inadequate to the purposes of its institution.”
James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June 8, 1789),
in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 441 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999). This new text, in Madison’s
plan, would immediately precede the well-known phrase “We the People.” Id. Similarly,
most of the individual amendments were first proposed as amendments to Article I, § 9, i.e.,
as limits on congressional power: “The decision to propose the amendments as separate
articles, while hotly controverted, was based on stylistic rather than substantive
considerations.” DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST
PERIOD, 1789-1801, 856 (1996). In presenting his proposal to Congress, Madison observed
that:
First. That there be prefixed to the Constitution a declaration—That all
power is originally vested in, and consequently derived from, the people.
That Government is instituted, and ought to be exercised for the benefit of
the people; which consists in the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the
right of acquiring and using property, and generally of pursuing and
obtaining happiness and safety.
That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to
reform or change their Government, whenever it be found adverse or
inadequate to the purposes of its institution.
James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments, in JAMES
MADISON: WRITINGS 441 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999). Roger Sherman of Connecticut
replied, “The truth is better asserted than it can be by any words what so ever. The words
‘We the People’ in the original Constitution are as copious and expressive as possible.” Five
Items Congress Deleted from Madison’s Original Bill of Rights, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (Dec.
13, 2015), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2016/12/five-items-congress-deleted-frommadisons-original-bill-of-rights/. As David Currie observes, “The principal objection voiced
to amending the Preamble to affirm popular sovereignty was that the same idea was already
expressed in the introductory phrase ‘We, the people.’” David P. Currie, The Constitution in
Congress: Substantive Issues in the First Congress, 1789–1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 852
n.450 (1994). The final language of the Preamble to the Bill of Rights was approved by the
Senate on September 8, 1789. Kurt T. Lash, James Madison’s Celebrated Report of 1800:
The Transformation of the Tenth Amendment, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 165, 175–76 nn.88–
89 (2006).
11
Ironically, the Preamble to the Bill of Rights is well known and oft quoted by citizens
active in Second Amendment and guns-rights groups. See Civic Constitutionalism, supra
note 9.
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do not reproduce it.12 One of the things I consider here is the reasons for its
obscurity. A second consideration concerns the effects of that obscurity. As
it turns out, these are very related questions—if indeed not the same inquiry
put two ways.
The reasons for the obscurity of the Preamble to the Bill of Rights lie
in a choice we have made about how to read the Constitution and in turn
about how to read the Bill of Rights. As I have argued elsewhere, there are
two principal ways to read the Constitution—two ways of understanding the
Constitution’s claim to authority.13 Both of these are two very different ways
of comprehending what kind of community the Constitution envisions and
constitutes. One conception, the Juridic Constitution, locates the Constitution
in law. The other, the Civic Constitution, grounds the Constitution in
politics.14
The Juridic Constitution (and likewise most scholarly accounts of
constitutional maintenance) invests judges with primary, if not exclusive,
responsibility for maintaining our constitutional commitments. I call it the
Juridic Constitution, not the legal constitution, because the word juridic
highlights issues of ownership and exclusivity.15 Because it is law, the Juridic
Constitution is the property of judges and lawyers, who have assumed
primary institutional responsibility for maintaining the Constitution.
Locating the Juridic Constitution’s authority in law influences how we read
and understand the text: indeed, lawyers have reconstituted the text in their
own image. “Our conception of the Constitution has been shaped by
[lawyer’s] instincts and intellectual habits.”16

12
An interesting question arises as to whether the Preamble to the Bill of Rights is
actually a part of the Constitution or not. The Preamble was sent to the states with the
proposed amendments, but whether the states, in ratifying those amendments, ratified the
Preamble to them is a more complicated question and not only because not all of the original
amendments were ratified. In any event, most copies of the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights do not include the Preamble to the Bill of Rights. But see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE
INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION (2008) (reproducing the Preamble to the Bill of Rights in full, a
notable exception).
13
PEOPLING, supra note 1, at 1–32.
14
Preliminaries, supra note 1, at 41–69.
15
See EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT (1938); ROBERT F. NAGEL,
CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1989).
16
Preliminaries, supra note 1, at 41–69.
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The Civic Constitution, in contrast, emphasizes the Constitution’s
identity as a political text. Civic constitutionalism embraces a very different
understanding about what the constitutional enterprise means, about what it
entails, and about how to maintain it over time than does the more commonly
understood Juridic Constitution. The Civic Constitution does not reduce to or
find its primary expression through law. Instead, its identity is found in
politics. The Civic Constitution anticipates a community in which
constitutional questions are, first, matters of publicly debatable civic
aspirations to practice a constitutional way of life. Its purposes are to establish
a community—a civic culture—that prizes questions about the fundamental
principles and purposes of shared social life. These principles include, among
others, the meaning of liberty, equality, and justice. Under the Civic
Constitution, discussion about the “basic organizing” principles of
constitutional life are therefore as much—and likely more—questions about
politics as they are about legal reasoning. It requires that we consider that the
juridic understanding of the Constitution is insufficient to the achievement of
a constitutional way of life.17
Implicit in Juridic and Civic constitutionalism are two very different
conceptions of constitutional maintenance and to whom it should be
entrusted. The juridic conception embodies a particular and narrow
conception of what the project of constitutional maintenance comprehends
(preserving the law) and to whom it is assigned (judges). The civic
conception of constitutional maintenance, in contrast, relies heavily on a
robust understanding of civic duty and citizenship as well as an ambitious
and deeply democratic project of civic education in the principles and
commitments central to a constitutional way of life. The Civic Constitution
assigns a broader, more expansive purpose to the text than simply subjecting
the state to higher law, and consequently it asks more of citizens in realizing
that purpose.
We do not always appreciate that these different conceptions of
constitutional authority and identity influence not only how we read the
Constitution but also what parts of the Constitution we read and, indeed,
whether we read them at all. Put more directly, our common understanding
of the Constitution as essentially a creation and instrument of law, composed
of powers, rights, and liberties enforced primarily by judges, has caused us
17

The material in this paragraph is adapted from PEOPLING, supra note 1, at 1–32.
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not only to misapprehend the significance of the Great Preamble but also to
ignore the other preambles in the Constitution. The purposes and significance
we assign to these preambles depend in large measure on what kind of thing
we think the Constitution is.
I. PREAMBULAR PROVISIONS AS CLAIMS ABOUT CONSTITUTIONAL
AUTHORITY
My claim that preambles are important because they contribute to our
understanding of the Constitution—of what kind of thing it is and what it tells
us about our constitutional selves—should seem unexceptional. As Mark
Tushnet has noted, “[P]reambles to constitutions are exceptionally
informative in conveying the underlying meaning of the collective enterprise
that is the constitution.”18
As is well known, however, the Great Preamble’s part in establishing
constitutional meaning, especially for judges, is more symbolic than
substantive, more rhetorical than real. If judges have not reduced it to “a
steaming chunk of rhetoric,” 19 the Great Preamble nonetheless is of no
consequence in contemporary constitutional litigation. Joseph Story’s
assessment, alluded to above, captures the general rule: a preamble
“expounds the nature and extent” of the powers “actually conferred by the
constitution” but it does not “create them.” 20 On this reading, a preamble
creates no substantive powers and no substantive liberties, but it may be used
to discern the purposes and objects of the Constitution broadly.21 This is the
18

GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 12 (2010).
WALTER F. MURPHY, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: CREATING AND MAINTAINING
A JUST POLITICAL ORDER 209 (2007).
20
David Thomas Konig, Why the Second Amendment Has a Preamble: Original Public
Meaning and the Political Culture of Written Constitutions in Revolutionary America, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1295, 1296 (2009).
21
Or, as Eugene Volokh concludes:
What then does the justification clause mean? It might have a political and
educational goal--stressing to the public and government officials the
connection between an armed citizenry and freedom, just as other
provisions may aim to persuade people about the desirability of “a more
perfect Union” or the virtue of local trials or the importance of the liberty
of the press. But we still properly expect the clause, like all constitutional
provisions, to have some legal meaning. To borrow from United States v.
Miller, the only 20th-century Supreme Court case that deals with the
Second Amendment at any length, it seems reasonable to say: “With
obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the
effectiveness of [the Militia] the declaration and guarantee of the Second
Amendment were made. It must be interpreted and applied with that end
19
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position adopted by Chester Antieau, who concludes in his well-known book,
Constitutional Construction, that “[t]he Preamble . . . illuminates the objects
of the Framers and, thus, can be a guide to construction, but it is not
considered to confer powers or rights.” 22 Judicial treatments of the
Constitution’s other preambles confirms their general irrelevance in
constitutional interpretation.23
Embedded in these sorts of treatments are two claims about the
meaning of preambles in constitutional design and maintenance. The first is
that a preamble has little significance when judges take up the business of
constitutional interpretation. The paradigmatic example of this position is
Justice Harlan’s opinion for the Court in Jacobson v. Massachusetts,24 where
he observed:
Although that Preamble indicates the general purposes for
which the people ordained and established the Constitution, it
has never been regarded as the source of any substantive
power conferred on the Government of the United States or
on any of its Departments. Such powers embrace only those
expressly granted in the body of the Constitution and such as
may be implied from those so granted. Although, therefore,
one of the declared objects of the Constitution was to secure
the blessings of liberty to all under the sovereign jurisdiction
and authority of the United States, no power can be exerted to
that end by the United States unless, apart from the Preamble,

in view.” I believe the justification clause may aid construction of the
operative clause but may not trump the meaning of the operative clause:
To the extent the operative clause is ambiguous, the justification clause
may inform our interpretation of it, but the justification clause can’t take
away what the operative clause provides. And because we know that
operative clauses may be at times broader and at times narrower than
justification clauses, we should accept that the two clauses will sometimes
point in different directions.
Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 807 (1998).
22
CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 31 (1982).
23
See generally Milton Handler et al., A Reconsideration of the Relevance and
Materiality of the Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 117
(1990); but see District of Columbia v. Heller, 550 U.S. 570 (2008).
24
197 U.S. 11 (1905).
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it be found in some express delegation of power or in some
power to be properly implied therefrom.25
The second assumption, a fair but not strictly a necessary consequence of the
first one, is that any significance the Great Preamble does have is merely
exhortatory, subordinate, and secondary to the Constitution’s meaning and
enforcement: the project of constitutional maintenance.
Like the Great Preamble, the Preamble to the Bill of Rights declares
an overarching purpose to achieve the “beneficent ends” of the constitutional
enterprise, which is equally insignificant to the Juridic Constitution.26 Read
through a juridic lens, the Preamble to the Bill of Rights has little significance
because it creates no substantive rights and has little to say about how any of
the provisions of the Bill of Rights should be approached as rights claims.27
A juridic reading of the constitutional text thus has no use for the Preamble
to the Bill of Rights because it offers little of interpretive significance for how
judges make sense of the individual provisions of the Bill of Rights in the
process of constitutional litigation over their meaning and enforcement. Put
another way, when read juridically the provisions of the Bill of Rights require
no reference to the Preamble to the Bill of Rights because the Preamble to the
Bill of Rights has no significant bearing on what the individual provisions of
the Bill of Rights mean or how judges should enforce them.28 Its peripherality

25

Id. at 13.
Volokh, supra note 21, at 807. Eugene Volokh has argued that many preambular
provisions (although his focus is on the preambular language of the Second Amendment, a
key part of Volokh’s claim is that justification clauses were a commonplace of state
constitutional design) include both justification and operative clauses—the former, he
suggests, often create “political and educational goal[s].” Id. Such provisions “may aim to
persuade people about the desirability of ‘a more perfect Union’ . . . .” Id. These ends,
standing alone, create no rights and impose no substantive limitations on the exercise of state
power. In Volokh’s view, however, “we still properly expect the clause, like all constitutional
provisions, to have some legal meaning.” Id. My point, in contrast, is that its legal meaning
does not exhaust or preclude other meanings, or even necessarily trump them.
27
This is also true, one might note, of a civic reading of the Preamble to the Bill of
Rights. This misses the point, however. The purpose of the Preamble to the Bill of Rights,
read civically, is not to provide specific instructions to judges or very particular guidance
about the meaning of the individual provisions of the Bill of Rights as enforceable rights
claims. On the other hand, it is not completely irrelevant to an inquiry into what individual
provisions might mean in litigation, as I suggest below concerning both the First and Second
Amendments. See infra pp. 36–40 and notes 124–37 and accompanying text.
28
The Ninth and Tenth Amendments might be the exceptions to the general rule that the
Preamble to the Bill of Rights is irrelevant to how judges interpret the individual provisions
26
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to a juridic reading of the Bill of Rights is one of the primary explanations
for the obscurity of the Preamble to the Bill of Rights.
A juridic reading of the Bill of Rights assumes the correct, proper,
and best way to read it is one that emphasizes its character as a limitation on
powers through the device of rights that can be secured against the state
through litigation, or as “a legalistic set of protected rights.”29 Hence, the
primary significance of the individual provisions of the Bill of Rights is that
they may be enforced against the state in courts; therefore, they take on
meaning through the practice of constitutional litigation. This point is of
special significance: my claim is not only that the individual provisions of the
Bill of Rights take on meaning through constitutional litigation, but rather,
more specifically, that these provisions acquire a particular sort of legal
meaning and simultaneously fail to take on other sorts of meanings, meanings
that have a civic purpose and civic function.
A juridic reading of the Bill of Rights therefore emphasizes its
character as judicially enforceable limitations on states rather than as civic
educative statements about the body politic. This has two consequences: first,
it means that the meaning of specific provisions in the Bill of Rights is
determined by questions that speak to the problems of constitutional
interpretation by judges and not, more expansively, as civic commitments
and responsibilities. (For a good example, see my discussion in Peopling the
Constitution about civic versus legal readings of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.) Second, and related, it means that it is judges who read the Bill
of Rights and not citizens who hold little, if any, responsibility for their
realization or enforcement. A juridic reading of the Bill of Rights embodies
a particular and unique incentive structure: it simultaneously establishes
incentives for judges to read the text and disincentives for citizens to do so.
These disincentives trace from a kind of aphanisis, or what Tushnet calls the
“overhang effect” of judicial supremacy,30 in which the tendency of judges
of the Bill of Rights. I’ll say more about this below, but for now I would note that it is much
more difficult to read either provision as establishing an individual rights claim.
29
Donald S. Lutz, Political Participation in Eighteenth-Century America, in TOWARD
A USABLE PAST: LIBERTY UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS 31 (Paul Finkelman & Stephen E.
Gottlieb eds., 1991). As Amar observes, “We think the Bill of Rights is about individual
rights, not majority rights.” Akhil Reed Amar, Some Comments on “The Bill of Rights as a
Constitution,” 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 99, 100 (1992) [hereinafter Comments].
30
Mark Tushnet, Some Notes on Congressional Capacity to Interpret the Constitution,
89 B.U. L. REV. 499, 504 (2009). See also PEOPLING, supra note 1, at 133–34 (discussing
interpretive aphanisis).
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to assume responsibility for the constitutional text dissuades other
constitutional actors from doing so. But the cause of civic neglect is larger
and more comprehensive than a system of judicial review that installs a
particular kind of judicial supremacy. It is instead a direct consequence of the
Juridic Constitution itself, which significantly undermines the civic
components of the constitutional enterprise by further distancing citizens
from the constitutional project. In doing so, the Juridic Constitution trivializes
the Bill of Rights as an instrument of civic education by advancing an
understanding of the Constitution that emphasizes its legal character at the
expense of its civic ambitions.31
This conventional reading of the Bill of Rights is “discontinuous”
with an understanding of the Bill of Rights as fundamentally instructional.
But Amar writes that:
[I]f we look carefully at the Bill of Rights, we will see it as
much less discontinuous with the original Constitution than
most of us have been led to believe. Most of us tend to
embrace the conventional reading that the Bill of Rights is
fundamentally, paradigmatically, not about structure-that is,
not about things like federalism, bicameralism, representation,
and constitutional amendment. Most of us also think that the
Bill of Rights is not about majoritarianism…. We think the
Bill of Rights is about individual rights, not majority rights. I
think that is wrong. The essence of the Bill of Rights and the
essence of the Constitution are profoundly populist,
democratic, majoritarian, and structural.32

31

This juridic (and, in some ways ironically Jeffersonian insofar as Jefferson opined that
one of the benefits of a Bill of Rights may be their application by judges) reading of the Bill
of Rights deprives it of its real significance for constitutional maintenance as a “political
creed.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Priestley, 19 June 1802, FOUNDERS ONLINE,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-37-02-0515 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017).
But these two purposes are not mutually exclusive, even if disharmonic. See my discussion
of Jefferson’s appeal to the community concerning the Alien and Sedition Acts. See infra p.
14 and notes 39–41; see also PEOPLING, supra note 1, at 2–4; see generally JACOBSOHN,
supra note 18 (discussing the harmonic and disharmonic components of constitutional
identities).
32
Comments, supra note 29, at 100.
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Amar concludes that we should approach the Bill of Rights as a program of
“popular education”: an idea that “resurfaces over and over in the Bill of
Rights.”33
II. THE CONSTITUTION AS A TEXT OF CIVIC INSTRUCTION
How should we read the Bill of Rights, if not as a set of legal
prescriptions directed to judges? The Bill of Rights is both an instrument and
evidence of the Constitution’s civic character. From the perspective of civic
constitutionalism, the constitutional text is not just a collection of legal rules
to be applied by judges; it is also an important part of the civic educational
enterprise. Consequently, the civic educative part of the constitutional order
extends to how we read and understand the text itself—as a text of civic
instruction. The Preamble to the Bill of Rights is a piece of this fundamentally
civic understanding of the constitutional order. Approached through the lens
of civic constitutionalism, the Preamble to the Bill of Rights tells us to read
the Bill of Rights as an ambitious program of civic education in the key tenets
of the constitutional project.34
As Rousseau counseled in The Government of Poland, a chief
component of constitutional design must be how to facilitate the civic literacy
of citizens of new regimes.35 Highlighting this question has a profound effect
on how we understand the constitutional order generally. The question of how
we can create a constitutionally literate citizenry is a long and venerable one
in constitutional theory. Sadly, it is not a question that much concerns
contemporary constitutional theorists, who are instead often preoccupied
with arcane disputes about the methodology of constitutional interpretation
by judges.
It is easy to forget, especially in the shadow of the Juridic
Constitution, that one of the most important functions of constitutional texts
qua texts is to promote this very literacy. The civic import of preambles, if
lost or irrelevant to most twenty-first century judges, was thoroughly
apparent at the founding. As Konig writes, “the opening paragraphs of the
33

Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1210
(1991) [hereinafter Bill of Rights as Constitution].
34
PEOPLING, supra note 1; see also Preliminaries, supra note 1, at 41–69.
35
JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE GOVERNMENT OF POLAND (Willmoore Kendall trans.,
Hackett Publ’g Co. 1985) (1782).
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new state constitutions” in which framers “proclaimed what appear to twentyfirst century eyes to be idealistic but unenforceable principles and rights” are
“among the most misunderstood and unappreciated features of the
republicanism of the revolution.” 36 Breslin has likewise observed that
preambles reflect a view of “the public text as a considerable force in resisting
the rise of tyranny” or as reflecting faith in the text “as a public
pronouncement.” 37 On this view, a preamble “serves important civic
lessons,” in part by teaching us about the past and by serving as “constant
reminders[] of our constitutional ambitions and principles.”38 It is easier to
appreciate the civic import of these provisions when we recall too that in the
colonial era, “our modern notion of a judiciary that might review and void
statutory law existed only in incipient form.”39 David Thomas Konig notes,
“[B]ecause these provisions were not judicially enforceable, it is easy to
dismiss them as mere verbiage.” 40 Preambles were meant not to create
judicially enforceable rights but rather “to rouse the citizenry to their exercise
of republican citizenship.”41 Thus, “Our Constitution was self-consciously
written down to teach successive generations of Americans about their rights
and responsibilities, about the Blessings of Liberty.”42
Preambular provisions in constitutional texts are important, if not
critical, elements in these initiatives of civic education, often explaining
elemental precepts of constitutional governance in general and ambitious
terms. In addition, they include higher-order instructions about how to read
the constitutional text of which they are a part. Read as calls to civic life and
engagement, preambles help to install and reinforce a civic culture of
constitutionalism.
Both Jefferson and Madison anticipated that civic education would
play an important, if not critical, role in constitutional maintenance. 43 In
Jefferson’s words, “[W]ritten constitutions may be violated in moments of
passion or delusion, yet they furnish a text to which those who are watchful
36

Konig, supra note 20, at 1318.
BRESLIN, supra note 2, at 55.
38
Id. at 52.
39
Konig, supra note 20, at 1318.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 1319.
42
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and Our Posterity, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 573,
573 (1994) [hereinafter Posterity].
43
See GEORGE THOMAS, THE FOUNDERS AND THE IDEA OF A NATIONAL UNIVERSITY:
CONSTITUTING THE AMERICAN MIND (2015).
37

2017

CONCORDIA LAW REVIEW

15

may again rally and recall the people; they fix too for the people the principles
of their political creed.”44 On this reasoning:
The words of the Bill of Rights would themselves educate
Americans; hence the appropriateness of didactic,
nonlegalistic phrases such as “a well regulated Militia is
necessary to the security of a free State.” Such maxims were
the heart and soul of early state constitutions. Virginia’s
famous 1776 Declaration of Rights even featured a maxim
about the need for maxims! “No free government, or the
blessings of liberty, can be preserved to any people, but by . .
. virtue, and by frequent recurrence to fundamental
principles.”45
As a summary of those fundamental principles, a Bill of Rights “will
be the first lesson of the young citizens.”46 As Amar notes:
Patrick Henry and John Marshall agreed on very little in the
Virginia ratifying convention, but when Henry declared that
“there are certain maxims by which every wise and
enlightened people will regulate their conduct,” Marshall
went out of his way to agree that such maxims “are necessary
in any government, but more essential to a democracy than to
any other.”47
Madison likewise alluded to the civic educational aspects of the Bill
of Rights when, finally persuaded to draft a bill of rights, he wrote that “[t]he
political truths declared in that solemn manner acquire by degrees the
character of fundamental maxims of a free Government, and as they become
incorporated with the national sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest
and passion.”48 In Colleen Sheehan’s words, “Over time, a bill of rights acts
44

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Priestley, 19 June 1802, supra note 31.
Bill of Rights as Constitution, supra note 33, at 1208.
46
Id. (quoting HOW DOES THE CONSTITUTION SECURE RIGHTS? 31 (Robert A. Goldwin
& William A. Schambra eds., 1985)).
47
Bill of Rights as Constitution, supra note 33, at 1209 (quoting 2 DEBATES ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 137, 223 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1888)).
48
As Elkin has concluded, for Madison: “[H]ow best to secure fundamental rights—
surely one of the broad purposes of republican government and thus essential to
understanding how to design it—is not a task for legal reason.” STEPHEN L. ELKIN,
RECONSTRUCTING THE COMMERCIAL REPUBLIC: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AFTER MADISON
45
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as a kind of republican schoolmaster, serving as a civic lexicon by which the
people teach themselves the grammar and meaning of freedom.”49 Another
well-known quote by Madison makes a similar point:
What use then it may be asked can a bill of rights serve in
popular Governments? . . . 1. The political truths declared in
that solemn manner acquire by degrees the character of
fundamental maxims of free Government, and as they become
incorporated with the national sentiment, counteract the
impulses of interest and passion. 2. [Whenever] usurped acts
of the Government [occur], a bill of rights will be a good
ground for an appeal to the sense of the community.50
This is an important point in establishing civic literacy in citizens. By
elaborating upon and making public the criteria for constitutional success, the
Preamble to the Bill of Rights educates citizens into the meaning of
constitutional precepts and gives them tools for the task of assessment it
assigns to them. Ultimately, it provides the skills and information necessary
for citizens to assume their constitutional responsibility to tend to the
constitutional project.51
Importantly, the Preamble to the Bill of Rights and the Bill of Rights
also go some way to defining what success—and failure—mean in
constitutional terms. The Preamble to the Bill of Rights implicitly defines
constitutional success (and likewise, constitutional failure) in terms of ends:
discernible progress toward the achievements specified as desirable in the
Preamble. The beneficent ends referenced by the Preamble to the Bill of
Rights are the ends set forth in the Great Preamble. As judges frequently
remark, the ends identified by the Great Preamble—to form a more perfect
union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common
100 (2006). Instead, “[i]t is ‘political law,’ not ‘ordinary law,’ and as such it must be
interpreted by the various political organs that it calls into being, not just courts.” Id. at 99.
49
COLLEEN A. SHEEHAN, JAMES MADISON AND THE SPIRIT OF REPUBLICAN SELFGOVERNMENT 108 (2009).
50
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON: VOLUME 11, at 298–99 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds.,
1977); see also Bill of Rights as Constitution, supra note 33, at 1209 (noting as further
evidence of the civic character of constitutional maintenance that such appeals are to the
community).
51
PEOPLING supra note 1, at 25–27. I use the word “tend” in a particular way here, as
showing solicitude for the constitutional project.
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defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and our posterity—are difficult to comprehend as individual rights
that can be pressed in courts. They are programmatic ends, statements about
desirable states of being, that have the character of political ambitions more
than legal rules and whose meaning is necessarily subject to reasonable
disagreement by all members of the community. Their realization, in other
words, is beyond the ken of judicial actors.52
Equally significant, progress towards the achievement of these
constitutional ends cannot be settled by any metric located in law or utilized
by courts. 53 Assessments of constitutional success and failure require an
exercise of judgment: “Success and failures are not absolute states, but are
instead matters of judgment, in part because the terms are political constructs,
not bright-line legal tests, and in part because success does not require
perfection.”54 “Except in truly rare instances, whether we have succeeded or
failed in achieving a constitutional way of life will involve crude and tentative
assessments based on ambiguous evidence.” 55 Again, these kinds of
assessments are truly and in the largest sense political questions,
insusceptible of judicial resolution. Their resolution requires an exercise of
political and civic judgment, not the application of legal rules; indeed, our
courts have had little use for either Preamble for precisely this reason.56
Conceived in this light, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is not simply
to impose judicially enforceable limits on government but also to remind
52

LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE (2004). Sager’s under-enforcement thesis holds that some
principles of political justice, to which the Constitution is committed in abstract, “are
wrapped in complex choices of strategy and responsibility that are properly the responsibility
of popular political institutions.” Id. at 87.
53
See generally JACOBSOHN, supra note 18, at 147–48 (2010) (discussing the Directive
Principles of Social Policy in the Irish Constitution or the Directives of State Policy identified
in Article 4 of the Indian Constitution); PEOPLING, supra note 1, at 45.
54
PEOPLING, supra note 1, at 176.
A related difficulty goes directly to the meaning and measurement of
failure: How would we know if we have failed? How do we distinguish
between constitutional inadequacies, defects, imperfections, deficiencies,
flaws, blemishes, shortcomings—and constitutional failures? What would
constitute evidence of failure? Where would we find evidence of it? How
much evidence is necessary to substantiate the proposition?
Id.; see also Keith E. Whittington, Yet Another Constitutional Crisis, 43 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2093, 2111 (2002).
55
PEOPLING, supra note 1, at 176.
56
Id. at 41.
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governed and governor alike about the importance of constitutional literacy
for the durability of the new constitutional order. Hemberger notes: “[A]ntifederalists demanded a Bill of Rights because they wanted Americans to have
a shared understanding of the appropriate limits of governmental power.”57
Hence, “[t]o identify when the national government had exceeded the bounds
of its legitimate authority, citizens needed a ‘plain, strong, and accurate
criterion’ and a ‘permanent landmark.’” 58 And Amar notes too, that
“Madison had pointed to the importance of ‘public opinion’ in making the
Bill of Rights more than a mere ‘paper barrier.’”59
To reiterate: a juridic understanding of the Constitution and of the Bill
of Rights in particular, as legal limitations on state power (a reading greatly
facilitated by the incorporation doctrine60), has little use for the Preamble to
the Bill of Rights. On the other hand, a civic constitutionalist reading of the
Constitution and of the Bill of Rights gives both meaning and purpose to the
Preamble to the Bill of Rights. It reveals the Bill of Rights as part of a civic
constitutionalist strategy for advancing the project of constitutional
maintenance, conceived as a significantly more expansive and ambitious
undertaking than constitutional interpretation by judges. Civic
constitutionalism requires that we recalibrate how we think about the Bill of
Rights, less in terms of individual rights and more in terms of creating and
maintaining a shared civic identity, or as an ambitious program of civic
education.
A close reading of the Preamble to the Bill of Rights reveals four parts
that look different when read civically rather than juridically. The Preamble
to the Bill of Rights announces that it has two objectives: “to prevent
misconstruction or abuse” of the Constitution’s grant of powers, and to
extend “public confidence in the Government” by seeking to “ensure the
beneficent ends of” government. To those ends, it proposes “declaratory” and
“restrictive” clauses “in addition to, and amendment of” the constitutional
text. None of these claims is as self-evident or as uncomplicated as it might
seem.

57

Hemberger, supra note 9, at 148.
Id. (citing specific speeches by anti-Federalists).
59
Bill of Rights as Constitution, supra note 33, at 1207.
60
See generally Bill of Rights as a Constitution, supra note 33 (explaining that the
incorporation doctrine can be read juridically as a limitation on state power).
58
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“Misconstruction or Abuse”

A.

Like the other civic-oriented provisions of the constitutional
document, the Preamble to the Bill of Rights is a “statement about the
Constitution in its entirety.” 61 Somewhat unusually for a preamble, the
Preamble to the Bill of Rights simultaneously looks backward, in the sense
of instructing readers how to read the material that precedes it (Articles I–
VII), and forward, in the sense of instructing readers how to read what follows
it (Amendments I–X). 62 The Preamble to the Bill of Rights begins by
announcing a desire on the part of some states to “prevent misconstruction or
abuse” of the powers delegated by the Constitution to the new national
government. The narrower reading this elicits recalls the jealousy and fears
of state governments, and of citizens, of an avaricious national government
that would be disinclined to respect the limits of its powers. It thus instructs
readers to adopt a reading of Articles I through VII that guards against overly
capacious understandings about the reach of federal power. In other words,
the Preamble to the Bill of Rights advances a general rule of constitutional
construction; 63 grants of authority to the central government should be
construed in ways that account for two other constitutional imperatives—
respect for the states as sovereign political communities (a rule regarding
federalism), and respect for individual liberty (a rule regarding rights). The
Preamble to the Bill of Rights also tells citizens how to read the individual
provisions of the Bill of Rights that follow it. It tells us these provisions are
likewise geared to the prevention of misconstruction and abuse of power, and
in doing so it tells us something about both the proper objects of federal
power and the limited reach of those powers.64

61

Edward L. Rubin, How Statutes Interpret the Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. 297, 305
(2011).
62
The structure of this reading is similar to how Maryland proposed we should read the
necessary and proper clause in McCulloch in the sense that Maryland wanted to read the
clause as modifying/restricting the entire catalogue of powers that preceded it textually.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819); see also Burt Neuborne, “The House was Quiet
and the World was Calm the Reader Became the Book” - Reading the Bill of Rights as a
Poem, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2007 (2004) (reading the Bill of Rights as a single text, rather than
serially).
63
See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, YET ANOTHER CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS: DIVIDED
POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (2001) (distinguishing constitutional construction
from constitutional interpretation).
64
See infra pp. 31–32.
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The Preamble to the Bill of Rights is more concerned with the
integrity of the constitutional project. It speaks simultaneously to the object
of constitutional maintenance, conceived as preserving limitations on power,
and to the mechanisms of maintenance (civic knowledge). It imagines that
the mechanisms for maintaining the Constitution must include public
knowledge of, and responsibility for enforcing, these limits. Both are
evidence of a concern with the temporality of constitutional maintenance, or
a concern about maintaining the Constitution through time, in a way
consistent with its essential aims and the possibility that doing so will be
corrupted by human ambition unless checked by a vigilant citizenry.
In announcing a purpose to prevent “misconstruction or abuse” of the
Constitution’s grants of power, the Preamble to the Bill of Rights provides a
set of interpretive instructions, presumably from governed to governors,
about how to read the text. 65 I say “presumably” to highlight an open
question—one that goes directly to part of what is at stake in adopting a
juridic or civic reading of the Preamble to the Bill of Rights: are these
instructions directed to judges or to citizens? The way we write a text,
especially a constitutional text, is greatly influenced by who we think its
readers will be. When we call a text into being we simultaneously call into
being its readers. 66 Constitutions, like all texts, envision (or create) a
particular relationship between author and reader, one in which the text
interacts with, “instructs,” “directs,” or “controls” the reader in certain sorts
of ways and on specific terms. 67 It is important to note as well that this
process is simultaneously one of inclusion and exclusion. A juridic reading
of the constitutional text assumes that its primary audience will be judges. It
assumes, in other words, a particular understanding about what sort of an
activity constitutional maintenance is (legal) and to whom it should be
entrusted (judges and lawyers). It is a conception of constitutional
maintenance that makes little provision for constitutional literacy in its

65

It also reflects another fundamental assumption about the effort to construct a
constitutional community through a written text—that there are correct and incorrect
readings about what the text requires or forbids or, at a minimum, better and worse
interpretations of textual commands.
66
UMBERTO ECO ET AL., INTERPRETATION AND OVERINTERPRETATION 45–88 (Stefan
Collini ed., 1992).
67
Andrea K. Newlyn, Redefining ‘Rudimentary’ Narrative: Women’s NineteenthCentury Manuscript Cookbooks, in THE RECIPE READER: NARRATIVES – CONTEXTS –
TRADITIONS 12–31 (Janet Floyd & Laurel Forster eds., 2003).
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citizens and indeed constructs barriers of education and expertise that serve
as powerful disincentives for citizens to assume responsibility for tending to
the Constitution.68
But the language of “misconstruction” or “abuse” is better
apprehended as a statement about the Civic Constitution, i.e., as a broad and
expansive instruction to a robust and engaged citizenry about the meaning of
the Constitution and the nature, sources, and limits of governmental power.
Moreover, the language implicitly assumes that the power to adjudge
misconstructions and abuses of grants of power to the national government is
lodged in the people, a civic enterprise as much as a legal one. So, in addition
to telling us how to read the Bill of Rights, a civic reading of the Preamble to
the Bill of Rights tells us who its readers are, or who they should be.
What evidence do we have for this claim? First, the terms
“misconstruction” and “abuse” evoke assessments grounded in judgment,
uncertainty, and nuance rather than the precise and certain application of legal
rules that yield dichotomous results.69 We may say, for instance, that a judge
has misinterpreted a statute or a specific constitutional provision, but when
we misconstrue, we reference a different and less straightforward sort of
claim. To misconstrue typically has two senses—the broader one I describe
here—and a narrower one typically associated with the language of
grammatical error. If the narrower reading seems to capture the character of
legality, if not legalism, the larger one suggests a broader metric. And given
the construction of the phrasing that couples the term “misconstruction” with
“abuse,” the larger meaning should be preferred. The term “abuse” covers
even more ground, referring, for example, to “[d]eparture from reasonable
use; immoderate or improper use.” 70 The language of reasonableness, of
immoderation and impropriety, educes a civic calculation more than a legal
one especially since, as I explain further below, its referents (the individual
provisions of the Bill of Rights) should be approached as political ambitions
as well as enforceable rights.

68

PEOPLING, supra note 1, at 38–42.
See Wayne D. Moore, Constitutional Citizenship, in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS:
ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTION MAKING, MAINTENANCE, AND CHANGE, supra note 1 (discussing
the concept of dichotomy in constitutional reasoning).
70
Abuse, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/abuser
(last visited Mar. 4, 2017).
69
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Second, my claim about the civic meaning of the Bill of Rights is
supported by the circumstances surrounding the drafting of the Preamble to
the Bill of Rights. In the earliest versions, Madison proposed a revision to the
opening preamble, so that it would read:
First. That there be prefixed to the Constitution a declaration,
that all power is originally vested in, and consequently derived
from, the people.
That Government is instituted and ought to be exercised for
the benefit of the people; which consists in the enjoyment of
life and liberty, with the right of acquiring and using property,
and generally of pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.
That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and
indefeasible right to reform or change their Government,
whenever it be found adverse or inadequate to the purposes of
its institution.71
This new text, in Madison’s plan, would immediately precede the wellknown phrase “We the People” in the Great Preamble. 72 This matters
because, located here, it would be coupled with other broad statements of
aspiration and civic ambition; it would take on a similar republican and
instructional character. In other words, its location in the Great Preamble
speaks to its civic purpose.73 Similarly, most of the individual amendments
were first proposed as amendments to Article I, Section 9, i.e., as discrete and
individual limits on congressional power. David Currie suggests, “The
decision to propose the amendments as separate articles, while hotly
controverted, was based on stylistic rather than substantive considerations.”74
In some ways Currie’s description misses the point: removing them and
collecting them together facilitates their civic purpose by making them a
71

HERMAN VANDENBURG AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE FIRST CENTURY OF ITS HISTORY 185 (1897).
72
JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS, supra, note 10, at 441.
73

See Destro, supra note 10, at 381 n.22 (discussing the legislative history of the
Preamble of the Bill of Rights).
74
Currie, supra note 10, at 856. Amar likewise agrees, “There is no evidence that this
change was anything but aesthetic.” AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION
AND RECONSTRUCTION 143 (1998) [hereinafter CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION]. Amar
further agrees that the change was more than simply aesthetic, however, noting that
“[n]evertheless, the change had the unhappy effect of blurring the implicit rule of
construction at work” (i.e., of limiting the application of the Bill of Rights to the federal
government). Id.
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single, memorable text, one that invites and is amenable to recitation and
repetition by citizens as a civic creed. The stylistic change was necessary to
advance a substantive purpose. As Amar observes, “[A] bill of rights was
written to be memorized and internalized by ordinary citizens.”75
Finally, it is worth noting that each of the three paragraphs in the
Preamble to the Bill of Rights makes explicit reference to the People in their
civic, sovereign, and collective capacity. By invoking the sovereign “people”
in each referenced paragraph, it assumes that a final power of judgment about
whether such powers have been misconstrued or abused rests in the sovereign
citizenry. Each paragraph reads more as a political maxim, or as an expansive
claim about the nature and purposes of constitutional government as a way
of organizing political community, than as a legal rule. Amar has described
this sentiment as “populist” in character, but the better word is civic, which
implies and emphasizes our collective responsibility as citizens for
superintending the constitutional project.
“Public Confidence and Beneficent Ends”

B.

That the power to adjudge misconstructions and abuses is as much civic
as juridical in character is further illustrated by the Preamble to the Bill of
Rights’s several audiences. One audience for the Preamble to the Bill of
Rights is Congress itself, as illuminated by Madison in introducing the Bill
of Rights to Congress:
I appeal to those gentlemen who have heard the voice of their
country, to those who have attended the debates of the State
conventions, whether the amendments now proposed are not
those most strenuously required by the opponents of the
constitution? It was wished that some security should be given
for those great and essential rights which they have been
taught to believe were in danger . . . . Have not the people been
told that the rights of conscience, the freedom of speech, the
liberty of the press, and trial by jury, were in jeopardy? That
they ought not to adopt the constitution until these important
rights were secured to them?76
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CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 74, at 131.
KENNETH SHEAR, UNORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING 90 (Alice Porter ed., 2009)
(quoting ANNALS OF CONGRESS 746 (1789)).
76
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Madison’s appeal to his fellow representatives explicitly references the
public’s concerns about the new constitutional order, strongly suggesting that
the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to address those concerns and in so doing
to help cement civic fidelity to that order.
Another audience was the states. As Kenneth Shear observes,
“Congress acknowledged that the purpose of the Bill of Rights was to address
the recommendations of states . . . .”77 Calls for a Bill of Rights, at least as
described by some Federalists, were located in a “spirit of jealousy”78 and
centered, understandably, on concerns about the relative sovereignties and
competencies of the federal government and of state governments. On this
reading, the primary purpose of the Bill of Rights was to reassure the states
of the importance and inviolability of limits on federal power. As a strategy
for limiting federal power—or for preserving state autonomy—this is a
device that leans heavily on the fact that limits on federal power are
transparent and public, easily referenced by citizens and not, contra
Hamilton, in the complexities of constitutional theory or architecture.79
Nevertheless, the aim of establishing “public confidence” tells us the
primary audience for the Preamble to the Bill of Rights is not Congress or the
states but citizens—thus reinforcing Jefferson’s description of the Bill of
Rights as civic educative and preceptorial. 80 This is evident when the
Preamble to the Bill of Rights speaks of “extending the ground of public
confidence in the Government” by ensuring “the beneficent ends of its
institution.” Public confidence in the constitutional project is best secured, on
this logic, by making it more likely than not that we will realize our collective
aims (those identified by the Great Preamble), achieving a more perfect
union. The chief purpose of the Bill of Rights, then, is to advance the success
of the constitutional project by helping us to achieve its beneficent ends, and
those ends are best secured by making them public and by so doing educating
the people about their significance. The unspoken assumption (shared by both

77

Id.
One source of the quote is: Alexander Hamilton, On the Adoption of the Constitution
at the New York Constitutional convention (June 24, 1788). Another usage is in
Commonwealth v. Dallas, 4 U.S. 229, 230 (Pa. 1801).
79
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (1788). Madison’s view was more
complicated. See SHEEHAN, supra note 49, at 108; THOMAS, supra note 43, at 100.
80
SHEAR, supra note 76, at 198 (noting that “[t]he preamble mentions too that the
purpose of the Bill of Rights included ‘extending the ground of public confidence in the
Government’”).
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Federalists and anti-Federalists), in other words, is that the best guarantee of
constitutional success is a vigilant, informed, and responsible citizenry.
This last point is too often overlooked in studies of constitutional
government in general and of constitutional maintenance in particular. It is
much easier to maintain the constitutional enterprise, and equally to secure
civic confidence in the desirability and durability of constitutional
government, if the project can plausibly claim some measure of success in
realizing constitutional ends, or some measure of success in actually
achieving a constitutional way of life.81 So, the Preamble to the Bill of Rights
identifies constitutional success as an important element of civic maintenance
because success helps to establish and sustain civic fidelity to a constitutional
way of life.
The Preamble to the Bill of Rights tells us that one of the purposes of
the Bill of Rights is to advance public confidence in the prospect of achieving
the ends identified in the Great Preamble and to give the people themselves
a significant measure of responsibility for realizing them. Taking the
Preamble to the Bill of Rights seriously, as the Civic Constitution asks us to
do, therefore requires us to think carefully about its relationship to the Great
Preamble. Some scholars have detected some tension between the two
preambles. As Amar describes it, the discontinuity resides in the Great
Preamble’s deeply populist sentiments (“We the People” and the related
claims of sovereignty) and the apparent individualistic character of the Bill
of Rights. As I discuss below, for Amar this inconsistency is misleading
because, in his view, the Bill of Rights is less insistently individualistic in
nature than is commonly supposed. Instead, understood correctly, it is of a
piece with the Great Preamble because both are fundamentally populist in
character: “The Bill of Rights is not about individual rights and not
81

But see CARL J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY (4th
ed. 1950) (comparing the post-World War Two literature on constitutional reconstruction).
Barber’s definition of constitutional success is similar in many ways; it includes, for
example, establishing a regime characterized by a “healthy politics.” Sotirios A. Barber,
Constitutional Failure: Ultimately Attitudinal, in THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY 14 (Jeffrey K. Tulis & Stephen Macedo eds., 2015). He argues further that
constitutional success depends ultimately on a stratum of diverse and self-critical citizens,
who see each other as moral equals and parts of one national community. Id. at 13–28. These
citizens, with the politicians among them, would be good-faith contestants regarding the
meaning of the common good and the most effective means to secure it. This shows how the
success of a constitutional democracy is more a matter of political attitudes than of
institutional performance.
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discontinuous with the Preamble, but rather consistent with its populist
character.”82 Amar continues: “Whether you look at the Preamble, with its
language ‘We the People of the United States,’ which sounds so populist, or
Article VII, the last article of the original Constitution, the essence of the
document, I would argue, is fundamentally participatory, democratic, and
majoritarian at the most important level.” 83 So the apparent inconsistency
between the Great Preamble and the Bill of Rights may be reconciled by
appealing to a higher level of abstraction (both place some significance on
the value of popular participation in governance).84 There are also contextspecific reasons that weigh in favor of continuity: the two provisions are
proximate in time and share the same cast of constitutional actors in their
drafting and ratification. Similarly, we might plausibly think the same “We”
the people are speaking, in a single voice, albeit at two distinct moments in
constitutional time.
Behind the claim that we should read the constitutional document to
facilitate its consistency and coherency is the implicit assumption that
consistency and coherency are desirable and healthy incidents of
constitutional identity. But there are also reasons why we should not assume
that what “We” said in the Preamble is consistent with what “We” said in the
Preamble to the Bill of Rights. Many of these reasons are grounded in an
alternative conception of constitutional identity, one that assumes the project
of establishing identity is not confined to or definitively settled at a founding
moment, but is instead a continuing part of the constitutional enterprise.
These arguments caution us not to presuppose that constitutional identities
are necessarily coherent, uniform, and stable, or that identity must cohere
around claims, principles, and characteristics that are settled rather than

82

Comments, supra note 29, at 100.
Id. at 101.
84
Amar’s definition of “declaratory” likewise stresses the compatibility between the
Preamble and the Bill of Rights in populist terms:
Thus, our First Amendment’s language of ‘the right of the people to
assemble’ simply made explicit at the end of the Constitution what [was] .
. . implicit in its opening. (Many other provisions of the Bill of Rights were
also understood as declaratory, inserted simply out of an abundance of
caution to clarify preexisting constitutional understandings.)
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 74, at 28 (citation omitted).
83
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repeatedly contested and re-negotiated. As Thomas Schelling, 85 Gary
Jacobsohn, and others have argued, it is probably a mistake to overemphasize
the harmonic elements of our identity at the expense of its disharmonic
elements: both are common, if not indispensable, components of
comprehensive constitutional identities. 86 Additionally, assumptions about
consistency and coherency thus appear not to comprehend the Preamble to
the Bill of Rights itself as a site or an object of continuing constitutional
conflict.
Once we perceive that constitutional identities may have disharmonic
elements, it becomes possible to imagine that what “We” said in the Great
Preamble (or who we said “We” are) may not be entirely consistent with what
“We” said (or who we said “We” are) in the Preamble to the Bill of Rights.
For example, we might read the Great Preamble as establishing a national
civic identity as well as incorporating an important principle of national
citizenship.87 But given the context of conditional ratification that surrounded
Madison’s introduction of the Bill of Rights in the House of Representatives,
we might read the Preamble to the Bill of Rights as an appeal to a conception
of our identity that is located in states. On this reading, the Preamble to the
Bill of Rights is somewhat at odds with the notion of national citizenship
implicit in the Great Preamble.
We should recall that contests concerning our constitutional identity
manifest early on and prominently in constitutional debates concerning the
drafting of the Great Preamble. At some risk of simplification, it is not too
much to claim that these contests resulted in a Preamble in which Federalist
understandings about the identity of the collective “We” triumphed. Recall
the letters of Brutus, for example, who argued against the Great Preamble
precisely because it was hostile to federalism:

Thomas C. Schelling, The Intimate Contest for Self-Command, 60 NAT’L AFF. 94, 98
(1980), http://www.nationalaffairs.com/public_interest/detail/the-intimate-contest-for-selfcommand.
86
See JACOBSOHN, supra note 18, at 1–33.
87
And that is braced later by the Fourteenth Amendment. One objection to this reading
has always been that it sits uncomfortably with the process of ratification prescribed in
Article VII and it is partly that inconsistency that Amar reconciles by appealing to a larger
principle of populism. Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional
Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 496 (1994) [hereinafter Consent of
the Governed].
85
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To discover the spirit of the Constitution, it is of the first
importance to attend to the principal ends and designs it has
in view. These are expressed in the Preamble . . . If the end of
the government is to be learned from these words, which are
clearly designed to declare it, it is obvious it has in view every
object which is embraced by any government . . . The courts,
therefore, will establish this as a principle in expounding the
Constitution, and will give every part of it such an
explanation, as will give latitude to every department under it,
to take cognizance of every matter, not only that affects the
general and national concerns of the union, but also of such as
relate to the administration of private justice, and to regulating
the internal and local affairs of the different parts.88
In the Preamble to the Bill of Rights, by way of contrast, we see a
reassertion of the anti-Federalist understanding of our constitutional identity.
The Preamble to the Bill of Rights reflected the concerns of those who wanted
a “guarantee that federal power would not be utilized to preempt important
state laws, institutions, and values.” 89 In other words, part of the civic
educational message of the Preamble to the Bill of Rights is the importance
of federalism as an enduring and foundational constitutional value just as,
perhaps, the civic educational message in the Fourteenth Amendment might
be closer to the opposite.
So the civic story90 related by the Preamble to the Bill of Rights, in
contrast to the Great Preamble, might be about the importance of federalism
to our constitutional identity. On this approach, the story of the Preamble to
the Bill of Rights about who “We” are is at some odds with the understanding
of the collective “We” in the Great Preamble. It reminds us that who we are
is an enduring object of constitutional contest.91
88

BRUTUS, ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS NO. 11 (1788), http://www.constitution.org
/afp/brutus11.htm. See Eric M. Axler, Note, The Power of the Preamble and the Ninth
Amendment: The Restoration of the People’s Unenumerated Rights, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS.
J. 431, 439–40 n.30 (2000) (“Among other objections to the proposed constitution, Brutus
maintained that the spirit of the Constitution, as announced in the Pre-amble, would infringe
on the rights of the states . . . Brutus supported this assertion by emphasizing that the
Preamble speaks of ‘We the People,’ rather than in terms of the states.”).
89
Destro, supra note 10, at 381 n.22.
90
I take the language of “story” from Breslin’s discussion of preambles as stories in
Worlds. BRESLIN, supra note 2, at 51.
91
In much the same way, the Reconstruction Amendments likewise remind us that
fundamental issues about constitutional identity, in this case, concerning the tension between
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The discontinuity between this message and the Great Preamble (and
later the Reconstruction Amendments) 92 may help to explain the relative
insignificance of the Preamble to the Bill of Rights to contemporary
understandings of the constitutional project. When faced with the prospect of
constitutional inconsistencies, many of us assume we must minimize or
harmonize them. One way to do so, as Amar has shown us, is to fold more
particular conflicts into a higher level of abstraction or to find some point of
commonality that undergirds, explains, and subsumes supposed conflicts.93
Another might be simply to deny that there is any conflict or to ignore it by
dismissing the Preamble to the Bill of Rights altogether.
But we should resist the temptation to paper over constitutional
disharmonies. Disharmonies recognize diverse aspects of our constitutional
identity; it is a mistake to assume they were settled conclusively at the first
founding (or the second, or the third).94 A civic constitutionalist approach to
the Constitution reveals that the Great Preamble and the Preamble to the Bill
of Rights both seek to constitute the political order around particular sorts of
civic lessons. 95 Behind them rest different understandings about who the
our national and our state selves, is never fully settled—not by the Great Preamble, nor by
the Preamble to the Bill of Rights. All involve conflict about the content of the civic
educative message that the Constitution itself was meant to convey. Sometimes that conflict
manifests at the level of constitutional amendments (as with the Bill of Rights, the Eleventh
Amendment, and the Reconstruction Amendments), at others, in interpretations regarding
the text’s meaning (examples might include recent case law concerning Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act of 1965). See, e.g., Shelby County v.
Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2617–22 (2013); see also Alexander Tsesis, Principled
Governance: The American Creed and Congressional Authority, 41 CONN. L. REV. 679,
715–19 (2009).
92
As Amar notes, in “pervasive and powerful ways . . . the Fourteenth Amendment has
reconstructed the meaning of the Bill of Rights in both the popular and the legal mind.” Akhil
Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1284
(1992).
93
Are we also to assume that these juridical conflicts can be settled by judges? An
example of such a tendency may be the Court’s recent decision in NLRB v. Noel Canning,
134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
94
See JACOBSOHN, supra note 18, at 1–32.
95
Additionally, we might begin to think that neither the Great Preamble nor the
Preamble to the Bill of Rights, taken alone and independently, expresses a single, coherent
message. The Great Preamble identifies several objects as part of our pursuit of a more
perfect union. Some of these objects may pull in different directions, thus indicating that we
desire many things, some of which may be incompatible with each other, or at least in some
tension with others. In this case, though, we should read them in ways that emphasize their
consistency, a consistency that resides in their civic message about the limits of constitutional
powers. SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS (1984).
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people are and around what propositions the people are constituted. This
should remind us of a point too often forgotten in the process of constitution
making: preambles are sites of contest as well as tools in contests over
constitutional design and especially in design decisions that go to the heart of
constitutional identity and the definition of our constitutional selves.96
C.

“Declaratory and Restrictive”

The Preamble to the Bill of Rights announces that adoption of the Bill
of Rights will add “declaratory and restrictive” clauses to the constitutional
text. There are two questions that we confront immediately. First, what do
these terms mean? Second, which provisions in the Bill of Rights should we
regard as restrictive and which as declaratory? Answers to these questions
depend in part upon whether we adopt a juridic or a civic reading of the
Preamble to the Bill of Rights.
1.
The meaning of “declaratory.” Our first question should be:
What does “declaratory” mean in constitutional terms? Amar’s take, one of
the few to consider the issue, is that declaratory provisions aim to “clarify”
what is already in the text: “Many other provisions of the Bill of Rights were
. . . understood as declaratory, inserted simply out of an abundance of caution
to clarify preexisting constitutional understandings.”97 Intimately connected
to this understanding of “declaratory” is the concept of civic education that
occurs, in large measure, through these acts of declaration. This declarative
function thus views the Bill of Rights as having a purpose that extends well
beyond judicial enforcement of its specific provisions as restrictions on
federal power. Instead, it sees the Bill of Rights as part of the great project of
constitutional education: “[T]he very words of the Bill of Rights would
themselves educate Americans—indeed, the Bill of Rights was written in
clear, grand phrases that could be easily memorized and internalized (like
scripture or poetry) in classrooms across the republic.”98 Amar’s definition
96
So maybe we should think of the Reconstruction Amendments, or at least Section 1
of the Fourteenth Amendment, as preambular provisions as well? I don’t go so far, but I do
think it is instructive to think of the Fourteenth Amendment, like the Constitution’s several
preambles, to be “a statement about the Constitution in its entirety.” Rubin, supra note 61,
at 305.
97
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 74, at 28.
98
Posterity, supra note 42, at 573–74; see also Bill of Rights as Constitution, supra note
33, at 1154.
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of “declaratory” likewise stresses the compatibility between the Great
Preamble and the Bill of Rights in populist terms:
Thus, our First Amendment’s language of “the right of the
people to assemble” simply made explicit at the end of the
Constitution what [was] . . . implicit in its opening. Many
other provisions of the Bill of Rights were also understood as
declaratory, inserted simply out of an abundance of caution to
clarify preexisting constitutional understandings.99
Asking this question as an inquiry into the Civic Constitution also
alerts us to the possibility that the meaning of those declarations is not
obvious but is instead itself the object of constitutional disagreement.
Moreover, a civic constitutionalist approach to the Preamble to the Bill of
Rights tells us that the meaning and function of “declaration” should not be
hitched to a priori assumptions about what substantive point is declared. The
amendments that comprise the Bill of Rights might “declare” things about
the meaning and substance of the constitutional order that go well beyond
clarifying or making explicit what is fairly implicit in the rest of the
constitutional text. This is a familiar point of conflict in debates concerning
the constitutionality of the Reconstruction Amendments. 100 They might
declare principles that, far from “conservatory” in character, instead
contravene or contradict or unsettle constitutional claims that were (thought
to be) widely agreed upon and assumed to mean something else. They may
declare principles, in other words, that contest rather than reaffirm prior
constitutional meanings. To be more specific, the Preamble to the Bill of
Rights might declare an understanding of the constitutional order that
disputes the vision implicit in the Great Preamble.
Hence, to approach the Preamble to the Bill of Rights and the Bill of
Rights as instruments of civic education is to invite us to see the purpose of
“declaration” in an explicitly political light—as instruments and as evidence
of political and civic conflict over the very nature and identity of the
constitutional order writ large. In other words, the language of declaration,
intuitively benign insofar as it suggests the simple purpose to clarify, may
99

Bill of Rights as Constitution, supra note 33, at 1154.
See PEOPLING, supra note 1, at 287 n.270 (regarding the disagreement between
Walter F. Murphy and Mark Bandon about the constitutionality of the Reconstruction
Amendments).
100
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instead signal profound disagreement about what principles need to be
declared. It is a strategy in an area of constitutional dispute. Ostensibly
declaratory provisions may in fact embrace a contested understanding of the
constitutional order and several of its cardinal principles.
Moreover, these conflicts are themselves a kind of civic education
insofar as key tenets of the putative constitutional order compete for
recognition and fidelity. These conflicts are also an exercise in constitutional
maintenance or a strategy of constitutional maintenance rooted in conflict and
contestation about the meaning of the constitutional order and about what it
is that “We” must maintain.101 To ignore the Preamble to the Bill of Rights is
to overlook significant points of conflict and disagreement about elemental
constitutional principles in favor of a misguided quest for constitutional
symmetry.
2.
The meaning of “restrictive.” The second question is: what
does “restrictive” mean? Restrictive of what? The obvious answer is that such
clauses restrict the reach of the powers assigned to the new national
government in Articles I-VII; in this way, the individual provisions of the Bill
of Rights should be regarded as limits on powers that are manifest in and
operationalized as rights claims by individuals. It is in this sense that we
should understand the Bill of Rights as essentially restrictive in character—
placing outside limits on grants of authority to the national government.
These rights-claim readings are deeply juridic in character because they read
the individual provisions of the Bill of Rights as creating rights claims that
can be realized through litigation and they disregard or have no use for those
parts of the Bill of Rights, such as the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, that
cannot easily be made to conform to this model. Recalling Corwin’s famous
metaphor, this approach sees rights as islands in an ocean of powers;102 it
101

In Constitutional Democracy, Walter Murphy pointed to several examples in which
the process of constitutional change involved neither the extreme means of civil war or
passive acquiescence, but instead a process of “mutual adjustment,” as happened in Germany
following reunification or in the United States following Brown v. Board of Education.
MURPHY, supra note 19; see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Indeed,
Murphy stressed how often constitutional change occurs through this process of adjustment.
MURPHY, supra note 19, at 503–04. But the process of amendment can be a battleground
over contested meaning as much as a process of mutual adjustment, and the benign language
of adjustment can hide or minimize the fact of conflict.
102
Edward S. Corwin famously described two alternative understandings of our
constitutional order. In one, rights are islands in an ocean of powers; a successful rights claim
by a litigant required the litigant to land on an island. In the other, powers were islands in an
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understands rights as exceptions to powers or as trumps on powers. But as I
discuss below,103 this may also distort the meaning of some provisions, such
as the First and Second Amendments.
A civic reading of the Preamble to the Bill of Rights, in contrast,
offers up a somewhat different understanding of the word “restrictive.” It
suggests that the provisions of the Bill of Rights are not trumps on, or
exceptions to, grants of power but rather are definitive, or constitutive, of
those powers proper. 104 This says something not only about the reach of
powers (and of rights) but also about the ontological status of rights as
“preconstitutional.” We might argue, following this line, that the liberties
identified in the Bill of Rights constitute a judgment “by We the People as a
Sovereign High Court that certain natural or fundamental rights already
existed.”105 This assumes that rights predate power (presumably because the
delegation of power comes from a sovereign invested with rights as a very
condition of its sovereignty). There is little if any indication of this logic in
the final language of the Preamble to the Bill of Rights, but Madison’s first
drafts suggest this, especially where they declare that “all power is originally
vested in, and consequently derived from, the people” and where they
announce “that the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible
right to reform or change their government.”106 Such claims are additional
evidence for the civic character of the Preamble to the Bill of Rights, for they
stand as meta claims about the nature and sources of rights in a constitutional
state—claims highly didactic (and declaratory of first principles) in character.
ocean of rights. The metaphor, in effect, describes two different default options. WALTER
MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 56 (4th ed. 2008).
103
See infra notes 122–36 and accompanying text.
104
I have in mind something similar to Barber’s argument that “[t]he Constitution limits
the proper exercise of . . . powers to moves that are consistent with constitutional rights.”
BARBER, supra note 95, at 24. On this line of analysis, Barber argues, “rights trump powers,”
id. at 25, but I think a more nuanced description of Barber’s argument is closer to what I
have written here: rights do not trump powers, or constitute an exception to them, so much
as they are a part of the definition of powers. Thus, Barber later writes that “Constitutional
powers are means to ends: more precisely, constitutional powers are authorizations to pursue
desirable states of affairs.” Id. at 72. These ends themselves include the protection of certain
civil liberties. See also id. at 106–07, 193–96.
105
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 74, at 48 (citing Henry P. Monaghan,
First Amendment “Due Process,” 83 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1970)). This is a position that Amar
convincingly finds implicit in the language of the First Amendment, as well as in the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments. Amar calls this a “declaratory” judgment, thus confirming that
declarations might announce restrictions. Id.
106
See JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS, supra note 10, at 441.
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It also recalls our earlier discussion concerning the meaning of “success” in
constitutional terms. Here success means a regime that pursues preambular
ends that include the protection of liberties instead of a conception in which
liberties are exceptions to powers.107
3.
Which is Which? A third question we might ask is which
provisions of the Bill of Rights we ought we to regard as declaratory or
restrictive. Some authors have argued that every provision in the Bill of
Rights should be regarded as declaratory. Thus, writing in Weimer v.
Bunbury,108 Judge Cooley stated that:
[T]he Bills of Rights in the American Constitutions have not
been drafted for the introduction of new law, but to secure old
principles against abrogation or violation. They are
conservatory instruments rather than reformatory; and they
assume that the existing principles of the common law are
ample for the protection of individual rights, when once
incorporated in the fundamental law, and thus secured against
violation.109
One might further suggest that an approach to the Bill of Rights that stresses
its civic educational purposes should regard all of its provisions as
declaratory, in the sense that “to declare” means “to say something in a
solemn and emphatic manner,”110 to publicize, to announce, to give voice to,
and so on. 111 I would add that this latter understanding of “declaratory”
makes no assumptions, unlike the definition proffered by Judge Cooley,112
about the conservatory character of the principles so declared.
On the other hand, some scholars think there is a difference in
meaning between declaratory and restrictive. Kurt Lash, for example, has
107

See generally Barber, supra note 81; SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, supra note 6; RANDY E.
BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 33–38
(2004) (regarding an overview of a negative rights/libertarian perspectives).
108
30 Mich. 201 (1874).
109
Id. at 214.
110
Declare, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/declare (last visited
Mar. 4, 2017).
111
This is the approach Amar seems to favor. See CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION,
supra note 74, at 28; Akhil Reed Amar, The Fifty-Seventh Cleveland Marshall Lecture “The
Bill of Rights and our Posterity,” 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 573, 574 (1994) [hereinafter
Cleveland Marshall Lecture]; see also Amar, Bill of Rights as Constitution, supra note 33,
at 1154.
112
See Weimer, 30 Mich. at 214.
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argued that the Tenth Amendment is declaratory, but the Ninth Amendment
articulates a restrictive principle.113 The Tenth declares the principle that the
federal government has only those powers the Constitution enumerates.114
The Ninth restricts power by declaring that rights are retained. 115 “As a
restrictive clause, the Ninth preserves the principle enshrined in the Tenth.
Without such a rule preventing ‘misconstruction’ of the Constitution, the
declaratory Tenth Amendment risks becoming an empty promise. Together,
the two amendments prevent the ‘misconstruction or abuse’ of federal
power.” 116 As this example indicates, it is certainly possible to see the
declaratory and restrictive provisions as working in tandem.
Following a similar logic, we might say that declaratory provisions
are civic educational, and likely nonjusticiable, whereas restrictive provisions
are rights claims that may be enforced as limitations on powers by judges
against other state actors. This suggests a possible division of labor—
restrictive provisions, if read as rights provisions, fall to the care and
enforcement of judges whereas the declaratory provisions might be the
province of other constitutional actors and citizens. My initial sense, though,
is that categorizing some provisions as restrictive and others as declarative is
not a good idea, chiefly because seeing the Bill of Rights as a project in civic
education suggests that all of its provisions are declarative of principles that
comprise constitutional literacy in the body politic.117 Moreover, this division
of labor is not a good idea because it necessarily results in the withering of
public responsibility for maintaining the Constitution over time. 118 The
Juridic Constitution does more than simply diminish the constitutional
responsibilities of other actors with respect to the judicially enforceable
constitution—its logic necessarily infects the entire constitutional order. It
does this, in part, by instituting disincentives for other constitutional actors
to take up their constitutional responsibilities, 119 or what Tushnet calls a
113

Lash, supra note 10, at 174.
Id.
115
Lash supports the latter claim by noting that Madison thought that “preserving
retained rights amounted to the same thing as prohibiting the undue extension of power.” Id.
116
Id. at 176.
117
See CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 74, at 28; Cleveland Marshall
Lecture, supra note 111, at 574; see also Bill of Rights as Constitution, supra note 33, at
1154.
118
PEOPLING, supra note 1, at 133–34; see generally Tushnet, supra note 30.
119
This is especially so to the extent that our understanding of the Juridic Constitution
yields, over time, a theory of interpretive authority that approaches judicial supremacy. And
114
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problem of “overhang.”120 This is not simply a consequence of a system of
judicial supremacy, though supremacy exacerbates it—it is a condition of the
Juridic Constitution itself.121 The juridic reading of the Bill of Rights122 has
overwhelmed the civic educational ambitions of the Bill of Rights, resulting
in a constitutional order characterized by profoundly low levels of
constitutional engagement and constitutional literacy on the part of
citizens.123
4.
Reading Individual Provisions. Although I cannot fully trace
out the implications in this Article, I hope it is clear that different
understandings of the constitutional text—civic or juridic—will also affect
how we make sense of individual provisions in the Bill of Rights. Notable
instances include the First, Second, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments. 124 I
have argued elsewhere that a civic constitutionalist approach to the First
Amendment, for example, requires that we recalibrate First Amendment
jurisprudence to promote the structural conditions that facilitate civic literacy
and civic engagement:
Understanding [these guarantees] as structural mechanisms
that allow associational life to flourish, and thus as facilitating
as some have noted, “there are features basic to any democratic constitution that are likely
to provide citizens with incentives of exactly the wrong kind—incentives that lead them to
be selfish and lazy rather than public-spirited and active.” Christopher L. Eisgruber, Civic
Virtue and the Limits of Constitutionalism, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2131, 2137 (2001). Among
these features are the electoral institutions often associated with large-scale democracies.
According to some critics, elections themselves reduce citizens “to alienated spectators,” and
voting reduces to the pursuit of self-interest or partisanship. Benjamin R. Barber, Neither
Leaders nor Followers: Citizenship Under Strong Democracy, in A PASSION FOR
DEMOCRACY: AMERICAN ESSAYS 98 (1998). Moreover, as Eisgruber notes, some particular
voting rules—such as the guarantee of anonymity—create an “incentive to act on the basis
of self-interest” precisely because voters need not defend or account for their decision as an
exercise of deliberation about the public good. Christopher L. Eisgruber, supra, at 2138.
120
Tushnet, supra note 30, at 504.
121
PEOPLING, supra note 1, at 133–34 (regarding discussion on the Juridic Constitution).
122
Amar has argued that the juridic reading of the Bill of Rights has exacerbated the
incorporation doctrine. See generally CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 74.
123
In Peopling the Constitution, I argued the more nuanced view that civic illiteracy of
the Constitution is less pronounced than commonly supposed, and equally a rational response
on the part of citizens who have, under the Juridic Constitution, neither cause nor opportunity
to engage constitutionally. PEOPLING, supra note 1.
124
See Hemberger, supra note 9, at 142 (concerning Second Amendment rights); Civic
Constitutionalism, supra note 9 (concerning the Second Amendment); see also John E. Finn,
Peopling the Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONAL THINKING 105–06 (Jeffery K. Tulis &
Sanford Levinson eds., 2014).
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the learning of civic skills and habits, gives us some guidance
about how such provisions ought to be interpreted. We ought
to favor interpretations of the First Amendment that facilitate
the flourishing of a wide variety of associations and
communities of faith. Our interpretation of First Amendment
guarantees ought to encourage social, cultural, and religious
pluralism by enlarging opportunities for citizens to associate
with others in civil society. In other words, we ought to favor
interpretations of the First Amendment that both open up civic
space and which help to populate it.125
In contrast, a juridic approach to constitutional maintenance does not
envision much of a role for citizens in realizing the guarantees of the First
Amendment, trusting their enforcement instead to courts (and this is typical
of most contemporary constitutional theory which, far from trusting citizens
to enforce civil liberties, fears or belittles their capacity to do so).126 Compare
this with Amar’s description of how constitutional guarantees, among them
the First Amendment, might be maintained by the people:
The emphasis on popular enforcement would of course prove
prescient. Less than a decade after the Bill of Rights became
law, federal judges cheerfully sent men to jail for criticizing
the government, but opponents of the Sedition Act—led by
Jefferson and Madison—ultimately prevailed by “appeal[ing]
to the sense of the community . . . . First, they attempted to
“appeal” from judges to juries, who embodied this community
sense. When blocked by judges, they used the media of state
legislatures to transform the election of 1800 into a national
public seminar on constitutional principles. Thus educated,
ordinary Citizens on election day registered the “community
sense” that the Act was a usurpation.127
125

PEOPLING, supra note 1, at 119.
See id. at 222–24 (regarding the juridic approach to constitutional maintenance);
James E. Fleming & Linda C. McClain, In Search of a Substantive Republic, 76 TEX. L. REV.
509, 547 (1997) (discussing the perceived inability of the people to respect rights and its
implication for constitutional theory) (book review).
127
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 74, at 132. Amar also writes:
Though their personal labors in founding the University of Virginia
signaled the special depth of their commitment, Madison and Jefferson
were hardly unique in seeing the centrality of public education. In 1775,
for example, Moses Mather declared that “[t]he strength and spring of
every free government is the virtue of the people; virtue grows on
126
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Amar’s take on the Bill of Rights generally, and the First, Second, and
Seventh amendments in particular, likewise stresses their civic educational
aspects:
The idea of popular education resurfaces over and over in the
Bill of Rights. As we have seen, each of the three intermediate
associations it safeguards—church, militia, and jury—was
understood as a device for educating ordinary Citizens about
their rights and duties. The erosion of these institutions over
the last 200 years has created a vacuum at the center of our
Constitution. An uneducated populace cannot be a truly
sovereign populace.128
The Second Amendment may also be rich with civic significance. As
Suzette Hemberger has noted:
For the Antifederalists . . . much more was at stake in debates
over the militia than the question of who would go to war.
Militia musters, even more than elections, were the occasions
on which white men experienced their status as republican
citizens . . . . Thus, when the Federalists held out the
possibility of relief from this admittedly burdensome
obligation, the Antifederalists foresaw the destruction of a
vital civic institution . . . .”129
Other scholars, notably David C. Williams, have also explored the meaning
of the Second Amendment in civic constitutionalist terms.130

knowledge, and knowledge on education.” After quoting Mather, Gordon
Wood sums up the ethos of the era in his own words: “And education, it
was believed, was the responsibility and agency of a republican
government. So the circle went.” “The most obvious republican instrument
for . . . inculcating virtue in a people was education.” We should not be
surprised, then, that each of the first six Presidents of the United States
urged the formation of a national university. In the didactic language of
the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 . . . .
Bill of Rights as a Constitution, supra note 33, at 1210–11 (citations omitted).
128
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 74, at 133.
129
Hemberger, supra note 9, at 141–42.
130
See Civic Constitutionalism, supra note 9; Civic Republicanism, supra note 9, at 551–
615.
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The civic dimensions of the constitutional text are also readily
apparent in the provisions regarding juries, referenced in Article III, Section
2, and in the Sixth and Seventh Amendments. Like militias, juries were an
occasion for civic engagement: “[B]oth were institutions in which ordinary
citizens would exercise power, and both provided opportunities for local
knowledge to be brought to bear in the implementation of national
policies.”131 As Konig has noted of colonial era juries, “Guarantees of rights
embedded in the text of the document, such as trial by jury, were thus
guarantees of the public institutions and mechanisms that would protect the
republican form of government necessary to individual freedom.”132
Many democratic theorists have identified juries as an important
instrument of civic education. As Tocqueville observed, “[T]he jury, which
is the most energetic form of popular rule, is also the most effective means of
teaching the people how to rule.” 133 Service on local juries was a vital
institution for civic engagement and learning for the anti-Federalists. 134
Conceived as instruments of reason and deliberation, juries are a critically
important device for civic education, not only because they teach, but also
because they can have a “profoundly transformative effect” in converting
“private individuals into public citizens, private interests into public
judgments.”135 “Simply put, deliberation promises to change how people act
as citizens.”136 Juries model a pattern of civility and conversation for the body
politic more broadly. Moreover, because service on a jury involves a
considerable expenditure of time and resources, in sharp contrast to ritualistic
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Hemberger, supra note 9, at 145.
Konig, supra note 20, at 1321.
133
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 318 (Arthur Goldhammer trans.,
2004).
134
See Hemberger, supra note 9, at 144–47 (regarding discussion of the civic importance
of local juries—and by implication why its mention in the constitutional document of 1789
is further evidence of the text’s civic and juridical dimensions).
135
John Gastil & Phillip J. Weiser, Jury Service as an Invitation to Citizenship:
Assessing the Civic Value of Institutionalized Deliberation, 34 POL’Y STUD. J. 605, 605
(2007). Gastil and Weiser conclude that jury service has a measurable impact on civic
engagement beyond voting. Id. at 619. They find in a large-sample survey of persons
reporting for jury service that “a rewarding jury experience was associated with increases in
a wide range of civic and political behaviors . . . .” Id. at 614. But see Lynn M. Sanders,
Against Deliberation, 25 POL. THEORY 347 (1997).
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Gastil & Weiser, supra note 135, at 606.
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exercises of citizenship like voting and saluting, jury service affords citizens
an opportunity to practice the civic virtues.137
5.
In Addition to, and Amendment of. As a last matter, we may
wonder why the Preamble to the Bill of Rights concludes by proposing
articles that are both “in addition to, and Amendment of” the Constitution.
To my knowledge, no one has ever proposed that there is any significance to
this particular language.
I suppose the phrasing may simply be a rhetorical redundancy:
amendments are necessarily additions to the constitutional script, not only in
a literal sense, but also because they typically make provision for some
concern that was overlooked or attended to insufficiently in the original text.
On this line of thought, every constitutional amendment is necessarily an
addition to the text. (On the other hand, some amendments simultaneously
add to the text, in the literal sense, and subtract from it as well—repealing
amendments, such as the Twenty-First, come to mind.) But is every addition
to the text necessarily an amendment? 138 Is it possible to add to the text
without amending it? The question is made both easier and more complicated
if we accept that it is possible to amend the Constitution outside the confines
of Article V. This opens up the possibility that some amendments, although
additions to the Constitution writ large, are not formal additions to the
constitutional document.139
One way to get at the distinction between amendments and additions
is to ask an obvious follow-up question: which of the proposed amendments
referred to the states in the Bill of Rights would qualify as “additions” to the
constitutional text, and which would qualify (instead) as “amendments” to
the text? One possibility is that additions have the character of additions when
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Id.
See, e.g., JACOBSOHN, supra note 18; see also MURPHY, supra note 19, at 504; Walter
F. Murphy, Merlin’s Memory: The Past and Future Imperfect of the Once and Future Polity,
in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT 179 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995). Another version of this question would
expand “the Constitution” to include more than just the constitutional document, thus
opening up questions about the relationship of the text to nontextual parts of the
constitutional order writ large, as well as questions about amending either the text or the
larger order through practice, interpretation, custom, and related “amendments” that might
occur outside the ambit of Article V. There is a voluminous literature on this question. See
generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (2000); Consent of the
Governed, supra note 87.
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they are essentially declaratory in nature, but are amendments when they do
more than make declarations. In other words, additions to the constitutional
text advance the self-announced declaratory purpose of the Bill of Rights as
a whole by declaring principles and rules that are implicit elsewhere in the
text, whereas amendments do more than declare—they effect some
significant change to extant meaning (thus recalling Amar’s definition of
declaratory discussed above). 140 Following Hamilton’s argument in
Federalist 84 about how the entire Constitution should be read as a Bill of
Rights, thus making a laundry list of rights unnecessary, if not dangerous, we
might then argue that the first eight Amendments are not amendments
effecting a substantial change in meaning, but instead represent additions to
the text—additions that are perfectly consonant with its extant meaning.141
As above, an obvious objection is that the function of declaration need
not necessarily be hitched to a priori assumptions about what substantive
point is declared. The amendments that comprise the Bill of Rights might
“declare” things about the overall meaning and substance of the constitutional
order that go well beyond making explicit what is fairly implicit. They might,
instead, declare principles that contravene or contradict or unsettle
understandings that were widely agreed and assumed to mean something else.
They may declare principles, in other words, that contest rather than reaffirm
meaning.142 To be more specific, the Preamble to the Bill of Rights might
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See CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION supra note 74, at 28 (1998); Cleveland
Marshall Lecture, supra note 111, at 574; see also Bill of Rights as Constitution, supra note
33, at 1154.
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HAMILTON, supra note 79.
142
This suggests a question: Does “amend” necessarily mean to “correct” or to “fix” a
prior version of the constitutional text in some way, or should it also include significant and
substantive alterations of the body politic? Put another way, is there a point at which
amendments to a text are so far-reaching that they amount to more than just amendments? Is
there a meaningful difference between additions to the constitution, amendments of the
constitution, and revisions of the constitution? The California Supreme Court took up some
of these questions in the fascinating case of Raven v. Deukemejian, where it struck an
amendment to the state constitution, the “Crime Victims Justice Reform Act,” because it was
a revision of the constitution and not an amendment to it. 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990). The
Court concluded that the proposal would have fundamentally changed and subordinated the
constitutional role assumed by the judiciary in the governmental process. Id. at 1089.
Following this logic, articles that purport “to amend” the text, in contrast to “revisions,” do
not effectuate some significant or substantive change in the meaning of the Constitution. But
there are other ways to apprehend what it means to amend. One alternative sees the
amendment process as a way of effecting or institutionalizing revolutions. This
understanding captures Paul Kahn’s description of amendment as “simply a point of contest
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declare an understanding of the constitutional order that disputes the vision
implicit in the Great Preamble. This again underscores the possibility that the
Preamble to the Bill of Rights and the Bill of Rights are sites of contested
constitutional meaning, of contests about the nature and identity of the
constitutional order itself. Indeed, the Preamble to the Bill of Rights might be
seen as a re-constitution of sorts of the constitutional order, this time
emphasizing elements of a constitutional identity that its proponents may
have plausibly thought were undermined or undervalued by the original
constitutional order (and the Great Preamble).
I do not want to assign too much significance or weight to these
distinctions, if only because they seem artificial, if not esoteric, even to
lawyers. We typically use the language of “amend” to encompass the
concepts of change, alteration, and addition and subtraction pretty much
interchangeably. 143 And also because the Preamble to the Bill of Rights
indicates that all of the provisions in the Bill of Rights were proposed as
“amendments” of the text. But I do think it is worthwhile to ask why the
authors of the Preamble to the Bill of Rights chose to use the language of
addition and amendment and to ask if the phrasing and distinction served a
purpose.
At the risk of reading too much into it, I think the phrase “in addition
to” does serve a distinct civic purpose. As Breslin notes, most constitutional
amendments in the United States “have been . . . individual and often isolated
attempts to manage specific political, legal, and cultural problems. We need
look no further than the amendments ratified in the twentieth century to
illustrate the point.”144 Unlike the later amendments, which typically we read
as individual, stand-alone modifications of the text (the Reconstruction
Amendments are an obvious exception), the Bill of Rights is a complete text
on its own—or at least, that is how we should read it.145 So, the language of
between competing understandings of the political order.” PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF
LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA 63 (2002).
143
MURPHY, supra note 19, at 498 n.4 (discussing Gordon Wood’s treatment of the
amending clause, arguing that Wood “conflates three concepts . . . (1) amendment . . . (2)
revision . . . and (3) revolution . . .”).
144
BRESLIN, supra note 2, at 105.
145
Amar has made this argument repeatedly:
To many Americans, the Bill of Rights stands as the centerpiece of our
constitutional order--and yet constitutional scholars lack an adequate
account of it. Instead of being studied holistically, the Bill has been
chopped up into discrete chunks of text, with each bit examined in
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“additions to” is meaningful because it signals that the Bill of Rights is meant
to be read as a whole and as having an instructional purpose and not simply
as list of individual “corrections” of the original text. 146 In this way, the
language of “in addition to” reveals a larger coherence and unity to the Bill
of Rights, as well as underscores its status as a text of civic instruction.
III. CONCLUSION
Civic constitutionalist readings of the Constitution embrace a
particular understanding about what the constitutional enterprise means,
about what it entails, and about how to maintain it over time. In counseling a
civic constitutionalist reading of the Bill of Rights, the Preamble to the Bill
of Rights conceptualizes the constitutional project as an effort to achieve a
constitutional way of life. It reads the Bill of Rights as an ambitious program
of civic education in which the constitutional document is itself a text of civil
instruction. The Preamble to the Bill of Rights is thus further and important
evidence of the Constitution’s civic character, of its efforts to create a
constitutionally informed body politic and to install a kind of civic
constitutionalism, in which citizens bear a significant responsibility for
maintaining the constitutional enterprise.

isolation. In a typical law school curriculum, for example, the First, Ninth,
and Tenth Amendments are integrated into an introductory survey course
on “Constitutional Law”; the Sixth, Eighth, and much of the Fifth are
taught in “Criminal Procedure”; the Seventh is covered in “Civil
Procedure”; the takings clause is featured in “Property”; the Fourth
becomes a course unto itself, or is perhaps folded into “Criminal
Procedure” or “Evidence” (because of the judicially-created exclusionary
rule); and the Second and Third are ignored.
Bill of Rights as Constitution, supra note 33, at 1131; see also Neuborne, supra note 62.
146
Currie, supra note 10, at 856. Amar agrees, “There is no evidence that this change
was anything but aesthetic.” CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 74, at 143. Amar
agrees that the change was more than simply aesthetic, however, noting that “[n]evertheless,
the change had the unhappy effect of blurring the implicit rule of construction at work,” i.e.,
of limiting the application of the Bill of Rights to the federal government. Id. at 153.

